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NOTES
MORTMAIN STATUTES: QUESTIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY
I. Introduction
Laws which limit a testator's ability to bequeath his estate to charity are
commonly referred to as mortmain statutes.' Such statutes have existed in vari-
ous forms in this country since our early history and, traditionally, their constitu-
tionality has been virtually assumed. - However, a decision by the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in November of 1976 was the second
within two years to strike down a mortmain statute as violative of the United
States Constitution.3 The court of appeals determined, as the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania had previously done with regard to the mortmain provision of
that state, that the statute violated guarantees of equal protection.
Although both courts found it sufficient to base their decisions on equal
protection grounds alone, two other theories have been vigorously advanced by
opponents of the statutes. These additional arguments challenge mortmain
statutes on due process and first amendment grounds. While these challenges had
been acknowledged, they were passed over without judgment in the opinions of
both courts. Thus, since the due process and first amendment arguments were
not expressly rejected, they presumably retain vitality as a basis for further
attacks on mortmain statutes.
This note will undertake an examination and evaluation of the three theories
which threaten mortmain statutes. It will then briefly review the salient features
of the existing mortmain statutes in light of these theories, and discuss the pos-
sibility that the remaining statutes will succumb to the arguments posed.
II. Background
Mortmain statutes first appeared in England in the thirteenth century.4
1 Technically, mortmain statutes are considered to be only those which place direct
restrictions on charitable organizations' power to acquire and retain real property. Statutes
such as the ones discussed herein which place restrictions on a donor's ability to give real
or personal property to charitable organizations, however, are also commonly referred to as
mortmain statutes. 5 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 589 (3d ed. 1967); Committee on
Succession, Restrictions on Charitable Testamentary Gifts, 5 REAL PROP. PROB. AND TR. J.
290, 291 (1970).
2 For example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania commented in dictum in Rhymer's
Appeal, 93 Pa. 142, 146 (1880):
While the propriety of legislation which thus limits the right of giving for religious or
charitable purposes may sometimes have been questioned, it has never been doubted
tmat tne [mortmain] act is constitutional. ...
See also the cursory treatment given the constitutional challenges to mortmain statutes in In
Re Kruger's Will, 23 App. Div. 2d 667, 257 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1965) and Taylor v. Payne, 154
Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615 (1944).
3 Estate of French, 365 A.2d 621 (D.C. App. 1976). Prior to French the district court
for the District of Columbia had found the District's mortmain statute to be violative of the
first and fifth amendments in In re Small, 100 Wash. L. Reptr. 453 (D.D.C. 1972). That
decision was not binding upon the French court so the statute had to be reexamined.
4 Magna Carta, 9 HEN. 3, c. 36 (1224).
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Their original purpose was to regulate the perpetual possession of increasingly
vast amounts of land by charitable organizations.' Dead hand' control by the
Church and other charities deprived the overlords of rents, taxes and fees upon
inheritance, and the incidents of tenure attendant to feudal estates. The first of
these regulatory enactments placed restrictions on the ability of charitable organ-
izations to retain real property. Until the eighteenth century mortmain statutes
generally continued to take the form of direct limitations on the power of
charitable beneficiaries to receive and hold realty.
In 1736, Parliament enacted the Georgian Statute of Mortmain.' Instead
of delimiting the power of the recipient to take, that statute placed restrictions
on a donor's ability to bequeath real property to charitable organizations at
death.' In addition to altering the object of the statutory limitation, a new pur-
pose was recited in the preamble to the statute: to prevent a testator from mak-
ing charitable bequests to the detriment of rightful heirs to his estate. It is this
second type of mortmain statute with which this note is hereafter exclusively con-
cerned.
Variations on the Georgian Mortmain Statute were enacted by numerous.
American states and have been subsequently repealed in most jurisdictions.9
Prior to the Pennsylvania and District of Columbia decisions, statutes of this sort
were in force in nine states.' Mortmain statutes essentially address the concern
that a testator may, as a result of frailties accompanying final illness or of fears
of impending death, improvidently direct that his entire estate, or an undue
portion of it, be given to a religious or charitable organization in order to insure
his own salvation. Their purpose is generally considered to be twofold. First their
function is protection, both of the testator against himself and of rightfully
expectant heirs to his estate. Their second function is to deter imposition upon
the testator by representatives of charitable organizations and the clergy who
hope to receive generous donations. 1
The seven statutes currently in existence in the United States may be
divided into three categories according to the nature of the restriction placed on
the donor's testamentary power. First is the type of statute prohibiting charitable
gifts made in a will executed within a designated time period prior to death. This
period ranges from thirty days to one year depending on the particular statute.
The second category of statute is one prohibiting charitable gifts which equal
more than a designated fraction of the probate estate. Third is a type of statute
5 See generally 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 1 at § 362.1.
6 Indeed, "mortmain" is literally translated as "dead hand."
7 9 Gio. II, c. 36 (1736).
8 Id.; See also Committee on Succession, supra note 1.
9 The most recent state to repeal its mortmain provision was California. CALIF. PROB.
CODE §§ 40-43 (West) (repealed 1971). Mortmain statutes have been completely repealed in
England.
10 See D.C. CODE § 18-302 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.803 (West 1976); GA. CODE
ANN. § 113-107 (1975); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-615 (Supp. 1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-31
(1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-142 (1947); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §
5-3.3 (McKinney Supp. 1976); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.06 (Page 1976); PA. STAIr.
ANN. tit. 20 § 2507 (1) (Purdon 1975). Iowa also has a mortmain statute, but, like the early
mortmain statutes of England, it has been held to be a direct restriction on the power of a
charitable beneficiary to take property. Ross v. Alleghany Theological Seminary, 204 Iowa
648, 215 N.W. 710 (1927). Iowa's statute is therefore beyond the scope of this note.
11 See, e.g., G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 326 (2d ed. 1964); 4 A.
Scott, supra note 1 at § 362.4 (3d ed. 1967).
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incorporating both of the former restrictions. All American statutes apply to
personalty as well as realty, consistent with their family protection purpose.
III. The Constitutional Challenges
A. Equal Protection
Equal protection was the theory on which the mortmain statutes of Penn-
sylvania and the District of Columbia were declared unconstitutional. Both
courts ultimately found that while the purpose of mortmain statutes, to protect
the testator and his family from improvident giving and from the overreaching
of charitable beneficiaries, is a legitimate state objective, the statutes under con-
sideration created classifications which did not bear a reasonable relationship to
this ascertained governmental purpose. The two opinions harmoniously held that
the mortmain statutes in question denied charitable beneficiaries equal protection
of the laws. Differences in analysis by the two courts, however, warrant separate
examination of the opinions.
In re Estate of Cavill" involved a will which directed that the residue of
Ms. Cavill's estate be distributed among five charitable organizations. Because
the will was executed only twenty-four days prior to death, the executrix of the
estate sought judicial clarification of the effect of the mortmain provision of the
Pennsylvania Wills Act of 1947." That section made voidable, by anyone who
would benefit from their invalidity, all charitable bequests made in a will executed
within thirty days prior to the death of the testator.
The lower court ruled that the residuary estate should be distributed to the
five charitable organizations named in the will on the grounds that the mortmain
provision in question was unconstitutional and should be given no effect. That
court concluded that the mortmain provisions of the Act violated the due process,
privileges and immunities, and equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment. The decedent's intestate heirs appealed the lower court decision
before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Considering only the equal protection argument, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court determined that the statute lacked "fair and substantial relation" to the
legislative object. Accordingly, the statute was violative of the charitable bene-
ficiaries fourteenth amendment rights. 4 The successful equal protection attack
was based on two separate contentions with respect to the statute. The funda-
mental argument concerned the thirty day time period which the court agreed
had the effect of dividing the testators into two classes: one class of testators
consisted of those making charitable testamentary bequests within thirty days of
death, whose gifts are invalidated by the mere objection of a dissatisfied party; a
12 459 Pa. 411, 329 A.2d 503 '(1974), reviewed by 37 U. PITT. L. REv. 169 (1975).
13 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 180.7(1) (Purdon 1964). This provision was identical to its
successor, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2507 (1) (Purdon 1975), and the invalidation of the first
applied equally to the second according to the court. 329 A.2d at 504 n.1. The relevant
language of the statute states:
Any bequest or devise for religious or charitable purposes included in a will or
codicil executed within thirty days of the death of the testator shall be invalid unless
all who would benefit by its invalidity agree that it shall be valid.
14 329 A.2d at 506.
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second class consisted of those making charitable bequests prior to thirty days
before death, whose gifts are invalidated only by strict proof of lack of testa-
mentary capacity or undue influence. Comparing this thirty day basis for classi-
fication with the legislative objective of preventing a testator who is in less than
reasonably competent physical and mental condition from making charitable
gifts, the court found the required thirty day period to be wholly arbitrary. In
finding this period not reasonably related to the testator's actual competence to
dispose of his estate the court stated:
Clearly the statutory classification bears only the most tenuous relation to the
legislative purpose. The statute strikes down charitable gifts of one in the
best of health at the time of the execution of his will and regardless of age
if he chances to die in an accident within twenty-nine days later. On the
other hand, it leaves untouched the charitable bequest of another, aged and
suffering from a terminal disease, who survives the execution of his will by
thirty-one days. Such a combination of results can only be characterized as
arbitrary."5
The second aspect of the equal protection argument involved the scope of
protection provided by the statute. The court, in a rather narrow fashion, de-
termined that the appropriate legislative objective of mortmain statutes is to
protect only the "near relatives" of the testator. 6 The Pennsylvania statute,
by contrast, permitted any next of kin to object to the bequest, regardless of the
degree of relation to the testator. The court determined that the effect of the
statute was to preserve the estate for relations not sufficiently near the testator
and not contemplated by the legislative objective of "family" protection, at the
expense of defeating the testator's intent. The court termed this result as irra-
tional protection of a "nonexistent fanily."' 7
Considering together these discrepancies between statutory purpose and
effect, the court concluded that the Pennsylvania mortmain statute was both sub-
stantially over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Over-inclusiveness was found
"[b]ecause the statute sweeps within its prohibition many testamentary gifts
which present no threat of evils which the statute purports to minimize."',
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Estate of French,9
likewise determined that the mortmain statute of the District of Columbia vio-
lated the beneficiaries' rights to equal protection. However, the faulty classifica-
tion attacked by that fourteenth amendment challenge primarily involved an
arbitrary distinction between classes of similarly situated beneficiaries rather than
classes of testators. The case involved a residuary bequest to two local churches
contained in a will executed twenty days prior to the death of the decedent. Like
that of Pennsylvania, the statute in question prohibited testamentary charitable
15 Id. at 505-06.
16 Id. at 505.
17 Id. at 506.
18 Id. Contrastingly, under-inclusiveness also existed due to the fact that the statute leaves
unaffected many gifts which do present such a threat.
19 365 A.2d 621.
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gifts made within thirty days of death.2" However, it was more restrictive in two
respects: first, the statute specifically prohibited only gifts made to churches or
the clergy; second, any such gift was completely void, as opposed to voidable by
potential heirs. The executor of the estate instituted an action seeking instruction
on proper distribution of the estate. The lower court granted summary judgment
for the charitable organizations, who were party to the proceeding, holding that
the statute violated both the fifth and first amendments. The defendant-heirs
appealed.
The court of appeals chose to rest its affirmance solely on equal protection
grounds and found that the classification established by the statute bore "no
rational relation" to the purpose of the legislation.21 The equal protection argu-
ment advanced in French focused on the parties who could improperly influence
the testator prior to death. The court found that the statute created two classes
of beneficiaries. The first class was comprised of religious organizations who were
conclusively presumed to have exerted undue influence if they were the recipient
of a gift made in a will executed less than thirty days prior to death. The second
class consisted of all other potential beneficiaries who, though recipients of testa-
mentary gifts made less than thirty days before death, were not presumed to
have exerted undue influence on the decedent. By comparison to the statutory
purpose, which was to insulate the testator and his family from truly being taken
advantage of during a time when the testator is unable to conscientiously
weigh relevant considerations, the court found the statutory language both too
broad and too narrow. On the one hand, the statute created a complete bar to
religious donations made within thirty days of death on the presumption, correct
or not, that they were unduly elicited. On the other hand, the statute failed to
reach other parties (lawyers, doctors, nurses, and other charities suggested by the
court) who are in an equally influential position prior to the testator's death.
Citing the additional arguments put forth in Cavill, and combining them with
its own objections to the statute, the French court concluded:
The statute is substantially over-inclusive in that it voids many intentional
bequests by testators who were not impermissibly influenced. . . . It is also
substantially under-inclusive in that it does not effect ... legacies to persons
who are in equal position with religious persons to influence a testator.
22
In evaluating these two equal protection arguments, the first, which attacks
an improper classification of testators arbitrarily set according to a time period
before death, appears to be broader in scope. It potentially threatens any
mortmain statute that sets a time within which testamentary charitable gifts are
deemed to be improper, since time before death is not necessarily a function of
testamentary capacity, regardless of the duration of that period. The second
argument appears to be more limited in scope; it applies only to statutes, similar
20 The District of Columbia Statute reads in relevant part:
A devise or bequest of real or personal property to a minister, priest, rabbi, public
teacher, or preacher of the gospel, as such, or to a religious sect, order or denomina-
tion, or to or for the support, use, or benefit thereof, or in trust therefore, is not
valid unless it is made at least 30 days before the death of the testator.
21 365 A.2d at 624.
22 Id.
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to the District of Columbia's, which specifically single out charitable religious
organizations. There is some promise that this argument will have broader
impact, however, since the court suggested that in addition to charitable bene-
ficiaries, others, including doctors, lawyers, and hospital personnel, are also
in a position to impermissibly influence the testator prior to death. Under this
view, even a mortmain statute which includes secular as well as religious charit-
able organizations could be considered intolerably under-inclusive according to
the requirements of equal protection. Nonetheless, the prospects for this "particular
equal protection attack are somewhat remote, barring the sort of inexplicably
arbitrary classification found in the District of Columbia statute.
The more promising challenge is that which goes to the scope of protection
afforded the testator's next of kin, particularly when applied to a statute such
as the District of Columbia's. There gifts were rendered wholly void by the
statute regardless of the existence of next of kin. Under that statutory scheme,
property would escheat before going to the named organizations. In contrast,
the Pennsylvania court criticized its statute merely for giving priority to relations
which it considered not to be of sufficiently close relation to the testator. That
court, however, probably defined the protective purpose of the mortmain statute
too narrowly by restricting the object to "near relations." So long as some ex-
pectant next of kin is given priority over charitable beneficiaries, the matter
seems to be a question of legislative wisdom rather than power. The willingness
of the Pennsylvania court to accept this challenge, nonetheless, indicates greater
promise for this argument than might first appear.
B. Due Process
Although due process was not relied upon by either the Pennsylvania or
District of Columbia appellate courts, the lower court in Cavill rested its decision
in part on due process grounds. The due process conclusion asserted therein
found that mortmain statutes raise an irrebuttable presumption of incapacity and
undue influence which has the effect of impermissibly infringing upon a char-
itable beneficiary's right to receive testamentary property. Because the conclusive
presumption is not reasonably related to the realities of undue influence or testa-
mentary capacity, such an invasion of property rights is a violation of due
process.
Justice Pomeroy, dissenting in Cavill,"3 argued against the validity of the
due process claim in a number of ways. First, he questioned whether in fact the
statute either created an irrebuttable presumption or altogether proscribed char-
itable gifts willed within a designated time prior to death. This is an important
threshold question because there is little argument that a state can absolutely
prohibit any or all forms of testamentary giving. It is a different matter, how-
ever, for a state to insure the transmission of testamentary gifts unless incapacity
or undue influence are shown, and then deem a particular sort of gift as ir-
rebuttably so given regardless of the actual fact. Justice Pomeroy maintained
that mortmain statutes create an absolute prohibition within the power of the
state.
23 329 A.2d at 506.
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However, the statute may more appropriately be characterized as raising a
presumption of improvident gifts. This is so because the statute's motivation is
unquestionably fear of unwise testamentary giving, and its effect is to avoid a
determination of whether the bequests were improperly made by mechanically
categorizing as unwise all gifts made within a certain period or of a certain
amount. No other type of testamentary gift, no matter when or to whom made,
is similarly void or voidable without a showing of incapacity or undue influence.
Justice Pomeroy further contested that any presumption, if raised, is not
irrebuttable for two reasons. First, he claimed, that proof of inclusion of a sub-
stantially identical gift in a prior will, executed before the thirty day period,
revoked by the violative will, saved the gift by operation of the doctrine
of dependent relative revocation.24 This escape mechanism, however, can be a
matter of judicial discretion, and in cases or in jurisdictions where this doctrine
is not invoked, the presumption is ironclad. Second, he argued, the presumption
which might be found can be rebutted, in the case of the Pennsylvania statute,
by obtaining the consent of all potential recipients of the gift. There is a dif-
ference, however, between being able to pursuade a variety of persons not to
exercise their power to void the gift without cause, and being able to present
arguments before a judicial forum demonstrating the competence of the testator
or lack of overreaching. Moreover, in jurisdictions where the gift is void rather
than voidable, this means of "rebuttal" is unavailable.
Perhaps the most effective argument put forth by Justic Pomeroy is that the
guarantees of procedural due process, on which this argument depend, do not
attach until a complaining party has some recognized interest in "life, liberty or
property." The power to receive property from a decedent is generally regarded
to be a statutorily granted, rather than a natural right. Therefore, without
some minimal interest in the testator's probate property that is recognized or
protected, a beneficiary's claim to the property is little more than a unilateral
expectation. Such a trifling claim of right cannot reasonably be considered to
rise to constitutional significance under the fourteenth amendment.
Although this factor may impede a due process challenge directed at the
beneficiaries' rights, prospects for a due process claim are considerably improved
if it is argued that the rights which are infringed by the irrebutable presumption
are those of the testator. When the testator's rights become the focus of discus-
sion, the required "property interest" seems to be fulfilled. State law has, by
means of an elaborate system of probate law, recognized a testator's interest in
his property as well as his interest in having the property pass according to his
wishes after death unless undue influence or lack of capacity is shown. This
interest, if sufficient, will cause the due process guarantees to attach. Mortmain
statutes may then, by creating an irrational irrebuttable presumption about a
24 Dependent relative revocation is a judicial doctrine whereby a bequest thought to be
revoked by a subsequent testamentary gift is revived. The doctrine is invoked when the re-
voking instrument is found to be invalid, and when it is determined that the testator con-
ditioned revocation of the first bequest upon successful operation of the second. There is great
disagreement at to when the doctrine may be applied, and courts have both considerable dis-
cretion in choosing to invoke it and in naming the preconditions for its application. See Warren,
"Dependent Relative Revocation," 33 HARV. L. REV. 337 (1920).
[April 1977]
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testator's capabilities, be subject to challenge as an impermissible deprivation of
his property.
To determine the nature of property interests which must exist before due
process can attach, a recent Supreme Court decision, Paul v. Davis,2" is instruc-
tive. Arising in the context of civil rights litigation under § 1983, the issue of
Paul was the specificity with which a particular interest must come within the
language of the fourteenth amendment to attain constitutional significance. The
Court acknowledged that a property interest recognized under the fourteenth
amendment may take many forms:
[T]here exists a variety of interests which are difficult of definition but are
nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of either "liberty" or
"property" as meant in the Due Process Clause. These interests attain this
constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially
recognized and protected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled that
the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever
the state seeks to remove or alter that protected status.26
Aside from the question of whether the right to dispose of property at death
is inherent or of purely statutory nature, unquestionably the power to dispose of
one's property is an interest recognized and protected by state law. A leading
authority typically comments:
The nature and extent of the right [to make testamentary dispositions of
property] has been the subject of much controversy by courts and text writers
generally, but all of them recognize the free and unlimited right of a person
of sound mind and otherwise competent to make a testamentary disposition
of his property according to his wishes, unless in contravention of some
statute or well-established rule of public policy or positive law.2 7
The due process protection against irrebuttable presumptions is applicable
even to preserve rights, such as that of testamentary disposition, which are wholly
regulated, and may even be withheld, by the state. A Supreme Court case,
Bell v. Burson,28 illustrates this notion that even a right which is granted ex-
clusively at the discretion of the state cannot constitutionally be denied by an
arbitrary conclusive statutory presumption. In Bell, the Court found that despite
the fact that a state had complete power to regulate who may be licensed to
drive an automobile, the state's issuance of a driver's liscerise implies a right to
maintain that license and use state highways. Denial of that right, by a con-
clusive presumption that could not be rationally justified, without an examination
of the facts under which it was revoked, constitutes a violation of due process.
Similarly, it may be argued that a mortmain statute's irrebuttable presumption
prohibiting what may otherwise be a completely valid gift, solely on the basis of
the date of that gift in relation to death, is to irrationally frustrate the testator's
protected interest.
Admittedly the due process argument is likely to be the weakest of the three
25 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
26 Id. at 710-11.
27 G. THOMPSON, Tua LAw OF WILLS § 17 (3d ed. 1947).
28 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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arguments presented. The premise of this contention, that mortmain statutes
raise presumptions of incompetence and overreaching, is a threshold question
which may be difficult to overcome. Furthermore, questions of "conclusiveness"
and vested fourteenth amendment rights add additional problems to the argu-
ment. Finally, the invalidity of the irrebuttable presumption, if created, depends
on the lack of a rational connection between the presumption and the actual
likelihood of the fact; the finding or irrationality is itself dependent upon the
arbitrary time period of the statute. Consequently, the effectiveness of this posi-
tion against various mortmain statutes is in actuality no broader than that of the
equal protection argument which more effectively challenges the arbitrary time
period designation of mortmain statutes.
C. First Amendment: Free Exercise Clause
Perhaps the most novel of the constitutional arguments against mortmain
statutes is the one based on the first amendment. Three lower courts have relied
on the free exercise clause and Judge Reilly rested his concurring opinion in
French solely thereon. 9 This argument asserts that promises of salvation and
the donations made in response thereto, which are the very objects of mortmain
statutes, are a form of religious practice protected by the first amendment.
Judge Reilly's concurring opinion points to the rights of the beneficiaries and
maintains that statutes which negative gifts made to religious organizations are
based on an assumption that salvific promises, in response to which the donations
are made, are illusory. Such a position of the government toward consolations by
the clergy impermissibly abridge the free practice of religion. Judge Reilly ex-
plained:
According to Appellees, the statute's main purpose is to prevent advocates
of traditional religions, particularly the clergy, from influencing the dying
by holding out hopes of salvation or avoidance of damnation in return for
generous gifts to practice the furtherance of religion. But such an object is
precisely what the "free exercise" of religion of the First Amendment forbids,
for it is premised on the assumption that such representations are false and
hence Congress can enact safeguards against their effect."
The District of Columbia statute was a particularly prime target for the
first amendment argument since it singled out religious donations alone, appear-
ing unusually discriminatory against religious gifts. There is promise, however,
that this challenge may be effectively leveled against mortmain statutes not
specifically confined to prohibitions on religious donations. A lower Pennsylvania
court in In re Reilly" also rested its decision to strike down that state's generalized
mortmain statute on first amendment grounds. 32 The Supreme Court has re-
29 365 A.2d at 625.
30 Id.
31 459 Pa. 428, 329 A.2d 511.
32 Reilly was reported immediately following the Cavill opinion, and summarily
affirmed on identical grounds. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court set aside without analysis or
evaluation the first amendment and due process grounds relied upon by the lower court in
Reilly.
[April 1977]
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peatedly held that even indirect burdens on religious practice must be closely
scrutinized for a compelling state interest which justifies their existence.3
Concededly, states have generally been given exclusive prerogative to
control the devolution of probate property. Nonetheless, state restrictions of a
person's freedom of religion have been held permissible only when 1) the state
is attempting to prevent a substantial evil; 2) the nature of the restriction is
reasonably related thereto; and, 3) the state's object is not readily achieved by
some other means. While it is possible to effectively argue that the testator's dis-
posal of all or a substantial part of his estate may be a significant evil, mortmain
statutes fail with regard to the two other requirements. 4
To further strengthen the first amendment argument, it would seem equally
sensible to fix upon the testator's first amendment rights. The very concern of
mortmain statutes is that a testator, in making a prohibitive gift, is religiously
motivated by hopes that his gift will help effect his own redemption. The dona-
tion of that gift, therefore, is precisely the practice of religious beliefs which the
free exercise clause protects, and his expectation that the gift will so function is a
protected interest.3 5
It is universally recognized that American mortmain statutes modeled after
the Georgian Statute of 1736 are not motivated by a sense of hostility toward the
Church."0 However, their direct prohibition of a type of donation which is a
meaningful and age-old gesture of faith could well be a broad target for future
first amendment attacks.3 "
Theoretically, since all mortmain statutes are directed against charitable
religious gifts, the first amendment challenge is applicable against all such
statutes regardless of their particular features. In this way the first amendment
argument has the greatest potential of the three theories for undermining
mortmain statutes. Noteworthy is the fact that the first amendment argument
attacks not the method by which states prohibit testamentary giving, but whether
states may prohibit testamentary religious gifts at all.
IV. The Theories as Applied to the Statutes
In summary, the specific features of mortmain statutes which become
vulnerable before each theory are as follows:
1) The equal protection argument strikes at three aspects of mortmain
33 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103
(1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
34 If family protection is the real motivation behind the statute, why is the family given no
protection against charitable giving prior to the statutory period or through inter vivos gift;
and why is family welfare not directly secured by protection statutes?
35 Religious beliefs and the practice of those beliefs must be distinguished. The freedom
to practice religious beliefs is not absolute, and does not generally extend to situations where
public safety or morals may be jeopardized. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (compulsory vaccination upheld); Church of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1 (1890) (prohibition on polygamy upheld). The right to freely practice, absent such
compelling state interest, is generally protected by the first amendment.
36 See, e.g., G. BOGERT, supra note 11 at § 326.
37 One of the important considerations of the Supreme Court in Murdock, 319 U.S. 105,
was the fact that the religious practice in question was one of long-standing tradition. 319 U.S.
at 108-09.
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statutes: First, provisions which invalidate charitable gifts on the basis of a
designated time period before death which bears an insufficient relationship to
the objective of isolating gifts which have been inadvisedly given; second, pro-
visions which "overprotect" by giving distant relatives of the testator priority
over charitable beneficiaries or permit gifts to escheat; third, provisions which
create arbitrary classes of beneficiaries by treating in different ways various
similarly situated parties capable of unduly influencing the testator.
2) The due process argument applies to mortmain statutes which create an
unrealistic irrebuttable presumption that a gift is improvidently made. Usually,
the irrationality of the presumption lies with the arbitrariness of the designated
time period of the statute.
3) The first amendment argument attaches to statutes which prohibit dona-
tions to church and church-affiliated organizations, thereby impairing the guar-
anteed right to freedom of religion.
Now follows an examination of the salient features of the seven mortmain
statutes remaining in various American jurisdictions, and an evaluation of their
ability to withstand these constitutional attacks.3"
A. The Remaining Statutes
1. Florida
The Florida statute comes into play only for the benefit of natural and
adopted children of the testator, his spouse, and the issue of his children. Over-
protection, therefore, seems not to be a vulnerability of the statute. The statute
provides for a six month time period within which gifts are prohibited, potentially
rendering it vulnerable to equal protection attack. The statute applies broadly
to most charitable gifts, so it is therefore not likely to succumb to the equal pro-
tection argument attacking arbitrary classifications of beneficiaries. This statute
has been specifically interpreted not to raise a presumption of incompetence, but
instead to limit directly the power of a testator to dispose of his property, thus
precluding the due process argument. Religious gifts are prohibited by the
statute, in possible violation of the first amendment.
2. Georgia
Like the Florida statute, Georgia's is limited to near relatives and in that
respect escapes the over protection argument. The statute places a ninety day
time limit on the charitable giving, thereby potentially violating equal protection.
The prohibited beneficiaries include all charitable, religious, educational, or civil
institutions so, although it probably does not create arbitrary classes of bene-
ficiaries, the first amendment argument is applicable to the prohibitions on dona-
tions to the church. Gifts prohibited by the statute are absolutely void, thus
opening the possibility for accusations of creating an irrebuttable presumption
in violation of due process.
38 The following overview does not provide in detail the provisions of each statute. For
their particular provisions, the statutory language itself should be examined. Citations of the
statutes appear at note 10, supra.
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3. Idaho
The Idaho statute shares the same thirty day restriction as that of the
Pennsylvania legislation declared unconstitutional in Cavill. A gift made in a
will executed within this period is void, and on this basis the Idaho statute risks
attack on grounds of overprotection and due process. The statute is applicable
to religious gifts, and thus is susceptible to first amendment attacks, but its gen-
eral prohibition of gifts to all charitable organizations precludes equal protection
attack on the basis of arbitrary classifications of beneficiaries.
4. Mississippi
The mortmain provisions in Mississippi are embodied both in statutory form
and in the state constitution. Consequently, any contravention of the United
States Constitution by the Mississippi statute impliedly invalidates its identical
constitutional provision. Nearly all of the earmarks for the equal protection,
due process, and first amendment arguments appear in this mortmain statute. A
ninety day time limit is placed on charitable gifts, which, if made during the
period, are void. Only near family is protected, and up to one third of the
estate is not affected by the statute, thus avoiding the over protection claim. The
statute's application to religious beneficiaries makes it susceptible to first amend-
ment attacks.
5. Montana
Montana's mortmain statute voids all testamentary charitable gifts made
within thirty days of death, without regard to the testator's surviving heirs. On
this basis the statute is open to over protection, equal protection and due process
challenges. The prohibition runs against all gifts to charitable or benevolent
organizations, probably avoiding an impermissible arbitrary classification of
beneficiaries in violation of equal protection, but falls prey to first amendment
attack.
6. New York
The New York statute is likely to escape attack on grounds of equal pro-
tection as well as due process since it takes the form of a direct prohibition on
excessive general charitable giving (one-half the estate), when the testator is
survived by near family, regardless of how long prior to death the will containing
the gift was executed. The first amendment argument may still be advanced,
however, to challenge the restrictive effect of the statute on religious donations.
7. Ohio
The Ohio mortmain statute voids all charitable gifts made within one year
of death when the testator is survived by near relatives. While the one year time
period is open to equal protection challenge, the other two avenues of equal pro-
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tection attack are foreclosed. The irrebuttable presumption raised by the statute
during the one year period may be the object of due process claims, and the first
amendment challenge is applicable, due to the statute's effective prohibition of
religious charitable gifts.
B. Prospects for Overturning the Remaining Statutes
As has been demonstrated, each of these remaining mortmain statutes is
vulnerable to at least one constitutional argument. Such vulnerability, combined
with a generally negative judicial view of mortmain statutes,39 would seem to
indicate that the disappearance of this type of restraint on charitable giving is a
likely possibility. Two obstacles to an acceptance by the judiciary of any or all
of these constitutional theories pose difficulties, however.
First, there remains a deep-seated view that control of the devolution of
property at death time is a matter exclusively within the discretion of the states
and is not subject to constitutional attack. Past decisions in New York,4" Florida"
and Iowa,42 ruling on constitutional attacks on their respective mortmain statutes,
have sustained them against attacks on equal protection and due process grounds.4"
While these courts questioned the advisability of certain mortmain restrictions in
particular cases, all have uniformly adopted the view that constitutional attacks
go only to the wisdom of the legislation and not to legislative power under the
fourteenth amendment. Illustrative of this judicial attitude is a passage taken
from Taylor v. Payne4" in which the Florida court rejected a challenge of that
state's mortmain statute on constitutional grounds. The court stated:
[T]he right of testamentary dispositions of property does not emanate from
organic law . . . but is a creature of the law derived solely from statute
without constitutional limit. Accordingly, the right is at all times subject to
regulation and control by the legislative authority which creates it. The
authority which confers the right may impose conditions thereon, such as
limit dispositions to a particular class, or fixing the time which must ensue
subsequent to the execution of a will before gifts to a particular class shall
be deemed valid; or the right to dispose of property by will may be taken
away altogether, if deemed necessary without the private or constitutional
rights of the citizen being thereby violated.4"
An attitude such as this will diminish chances that a mortmain statute will
39 Committee on Succession, supra note 1.
40 In re Kruger's Will, 23 App. Div. 2d 667, 257 N.Y.S. 2d 232 (1965).
41 Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615 (1944).
42 Decker v. American Univ., 236 Iowa 895, 20 N.W.2d 466 (1945).
43 The most sound rationale for mortmain statutes is well expressed by the New York
Court of Appeals in In re Kruger's Will where the court viewed their mortmain provision as a
protection of private rights and as an expression of public policy:
It has long been recognized that at the approach of death, a testator may be in-
fluenced by hopes or fears for his condition in the future world and may devise or
bequest the whole or principal part of his estate to benevolent charities or religious
institutions to the exclusion of his family and close relatives. For this reason it has
been considered the dictate of sound public policy to restrain testamentary disposi-
tions to such institutions.
23 App. Div. 2d at 668, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
44 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615.
45 Id. at 363, 17 So. 2d at 617.
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be stricken down under the fourteenth amendment. This is true because an
evaluation thereunder must be confined to traditional "rational basis" analysis,
since no fundamental right or suspect criterion is involved. A court taking this
view may easily sustain the statute by finding that the classifications created are
not wholly arbitrary. Indeed, Justice Pomeroy, in his dissent to Cavill, argued
that the majority, without justification, had applied the more stringent strict
scrutiny test.4" Courts of this pursuasion may, as Justice Pomeroy also suggested,
refuse to find that the legislation creates any classification or presumption; instead,
such courts may construe the statute as a condition justifiably imposed on testa-
mentary giving.
In contrast, due to the fundamental rights involved in the first amendment,
a challenge based upon this amendment would require strict scrutiny and a
reciprocal compelling state interest. For this reason, the free exercise argument
may be more difficult for courts to avoid. The theory was not advanced before
any of the three courts which ruled that mortmain statutes were constitutional,
and the Pennsylvania and District of Columbia courts reserved comment on the
theory. On this basis, then, the potential of the argument is promising.
A second judicial predisposition which must be recognized is a reluctance
to acknowledge and deal squarely with the rights of decedents. As discussed
above, the success of the due process and first amendment arguments will depend
in part on a concern with the testator's rights under the law. Courts are hesitant
to consider question of whether a testator's expectancy that his property will
pass according to his wishes is an actual right. Because this issue involves con-
cepts of psychological satisfaction and questions concerned with the continuance
of rights after death, courts, fearing that they will become ensnared in vague
and difficult problems, prefer to wholly avoid the area. However, a recognition
that a testator's interest in his property extends beyond its title, to a right to dis-
pose of it, is necessary. Despite the complexities involved, the right is both real
and significant.
Notably, both the Pennsylvania and District of Columbia courts held that
the rights violated were those of the beneficiaries and not those of the testator,
thus avoiding discussion of the testator's rights. In the Pennsylvania case, this
factor is somewhat difficult to understand since the impermissible class created by
the mortmain statute was that of testators rather than beneficiaries. A discussion
of the testator's rights in these cases is warranted, however, since the mortmain
statutes in question involve a restriction on the testator's right to give, not the
beneficiaries' right to receive property.
V. Conclusion
Last fall's decision by the District of Columbia Circuit striking down the
Capital's mortmain statute gave strong impetus to recent judicial stirrings about
the constitutionality of such limitations on testamentary charitable giving. The
two-man majority reinforced credibility in the equal protection challenge, to
which the majority of the remaining statutes are susceptible. The concurring
46 329 A.2d at 509.
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opinion chose to rest its rejection of the statute solely on first amendment grounds,
joining other courts which have ruled similarly. In addition to these two grounds,
a due process argument invoked by some lower courts may also merit promise as
a viable attack. Together, they comprise a variety of approaches which constitute
grounds for attack on the mortmain statutes which exist today in several Amer-
ican jurisdictions. Combined with a willingness by the judiciary to reexamine
old biases with regard to mortmain statutes, they may spell the demise of these
laws.
Some authorities opposing mortmain statutes have argued that there is no
longer a need for these statutes in present day secular society where fear of hell
and damnation does not have the overpowering effect it once did.47 It is im-
possible, however, to say that people today are less likely to rely upon good works
as a means of salvation. A better reason for elimination of this eighteenth century
anachronism is that the object of safeguarding family welfare can be achieved
directly by means of protection statutes.48 This solution is more rational than
mortmain statutes which may be easily avoided49 and which provide only the
most primitive means for distinguishing between improvident and well con-
sidered gifts. The variety of potential constitutional arguments and the serious
consideration given them in recent decisions indicate the strong possibility of a
growing momentum toward making mortmain statutes a thing of the past.
Kymson F. Desjardins
47 See, e.g., 37 U. Phrr. L. REv. supra note 12, at 179.
48 Id. at 178. See also Committee on Succession, supra, note 1 at 299.
49 Various methods by which mortmain statutes may be avoided are collected and analyzed
in Committee on Succession, supra, note 1 at 293-95.
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